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Abstract 
 
We experimentally investigate simultaneous decision-making in two contrasting 
environments: one that encourages competition (lottery contest) and one that encourages 
cooperation (public good game). We find that simultaneous participation in the public good 
game affects behavior in the contest, decreasing sub-optimal overbidding. Contributions to the 
public good are not affected by participation in the contest. The direction of behavioral spillover 
is explained by differences in strategic uncertainty and path-dependence across games. Our 
design allows us to compare preferences for cooperation and competition. We find that in early 
periods, there is a negative correlation between decisions in competitive and in cooperative 
environments. 
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1. Introduction 
Individuals, firms, and policy makers simultaneously interact in many different 
environments in practice. In the workplace, workers may engage in sub-optimal behavior such as 
exerting effort to undermine co-workers to get a promotion, while they may also put forth effort 
on cooperative team projects assigned by the manager. Farm owners may compete daily with 
each other in the market for their products and at the same time they may cooperate to build 
facilities that would be mutually beneficial to reduce waste management costs.  
The contribution of the current study is that we experimentally investigate individual 
behavior when competitive and cooperative environments are present simultaneously. To induce 
a cooperative environment, we employ a voluntary contribution mechanism (a public good 
game) and for a competitive environment we employ a lottery contest. In the voluntary 
contribution mechanism (VCM), individuals make contributions in order to provide a public 
good. In the contest, individuals make bids in order to win a prize. The type of contest we 
consider here is one in which higher bids lead to more socially wasteful outcomes. The main 
difference between these two games is that bids in the contest exert a negative externality on 
others, while contributions in the VCM exert a positive externality. The findings from the 
literature when these games are played in isolation are clear. In contests, individuals overbid 
relative to Nash equilibrium (Millner and Pratt, 1989, 1991; Sheremeta, 2011; Morgan et al., 
2012).
1
 In VCMs, individuals contribute half-way between the equilibrium free riding and the 
Pareto optimal level, with contributions declining over time (Ledyard, 1995; Fischbacher et al., 
                                                 
1 Overbidding decreases when subjects gain experience (Davis and Reilly, 1998; Sheremeta, 2011), when groups 
make bids instead of individuals (Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010), and when individual bidding space is constrained 
(Sheremeta, 2011). 
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2001).
2
 The contest is similar to a wide variety of situations in practice, such as patent races, 
political contests, competitions for promotions in the workplace, or advertising campaigns. The 
VCM is similar to another broad class of situations, including the decision to volunteer for 
various groups or associations and monetary contributions to public goods or charities. The 
design of the experiment permits us to analyze the correlation between each individual’s bid in 
the contest and contribution in the VCM. 
The standard assumption in game theory is game independence, suggesting that the 
institutional context in which a decision is made does not matter. However, a number of 
experiments find that context may matter greatly. Learning and knowledge transfer is found to 
occur in games played in sequence (Kagel, 1995; Van Huyck et al., 1991; Schotter, 1998; Knez 
and Camerer, 2000; Ahn et al., 2001; Devetag, 2005; Brandts and Cooper, 2006). A “behavioral 
spillover” is said to have occurred whenever observed behavior differs when a game is played 
together with other games, compared to behavior observed when the game is played in isolation 
(Cason et al., 2012). Recent experiments directly measure behavioral spillovers, and find that 
spillovers occur when games are played simultaneously, causing behaviors exhibited in one 
game to be carried over to the other game in a predictable way (Huck et al., 2011; Bednar et al., 
2012; Cason et al., 2012; Falk et al., 2012). Bednar et al. (2012) report a laboratory experiment 
with different two-player games and find that simultaneous game-play differs from isolated 
controls. Huck et al. (2011) study two dissimilar two-player games played simultaneously and 
find that learning spillovers occur when feedback is not readily available for each game. Cason et 
al. (2012) report a laboratory experiment where the same group of five players participate in two 
different coordination games and find that cooperative behavior spills over from one game to the 
                                                 
2 Contributions increase when subjects are allowed to punish, assign disapproval points, send signals, or 
communicate with other subjects prior to contributions in the VCM (Ledyard, 1995; Fehr and Gachter, 2000). 
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other when games are played sequentially. Finally, Falk et al. (2012) investigate groups of 
different individuals playing two identical coordination games or two identical public goods 
games, and find that behavior does not differ from a baseline where only one game is played at a 
time.
3
 The main difference of our study is that we investigate behavior in both competitive and 
cooperative environments, while previous studies consider coordination and public good games 
(Cason et al., 2012; Falk et al., 2012) or bi-matrix games such as the prisoner’s dilemma (Bednar 
et al., 2012). 
We find that overbidding in the contest is significantly reduced when individuals 
simultaneously participate in the VCM. This is a favorable outcome because higher bids in this 
type of contest lead to sub-optimal results (i.e., lower payoffs). However, we do not find 
significant differences in VCM contributions between the simultaneous-play and baseline 
treatments. The direction of behavioral spillover can be explained by differences in strategic 
uncertainty and path-dependence across the two games. The design of our experiment also 
allows us to comment on the correlation in competitiveness and cooperativeness of individuals. 
In early periods of the experiment, we find a negative correlation between decisions made in the 
lottery contest and in the VCM, suggesting that individuals who are more competitive tend to be 
less cooperative and vice versa. As discussed in the conclusion, this research has implications for 
political and management institutional design, and for related research that attempts to solve 
problems of overbidding in contests and under-contribution in public goods. 
  
                                                 
3 Other existing studies consider simultaneous interaction in several public goods environments, either breaking a 
single public good into multiple parts or presenting multiple public goods (Biele et al., 2008; Cherry and Dickinson, 
2008; Fellner and Lunser, 2008; Bernasconi et al., 2009). 
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2. Experimental Environment, Design and Procedures 
2.1. The Contest and the VCM 
The experimental design employs two laboratory games, a lottery contest and a VCM. 
The lottery contest is based on the theoretical model of Tullock (1980). In this contest, n 
identical risk-neutral players with initial endowment levels e compete for a prize v by submitting 
bids. The probability that a player i wins the prize is equal to player i’s own bid bi divided by the 
sum of all players’ bids. Given this, the expected payoff from the contest for player i can be 
written as: 
πi
C
 = e – bi + vbi/∑jbj.         (1)
 
Differentiating (1) with respect to bi and accounting for the symmetric Nash equilibrium leads to 
the classic solution of b
*
 = v(n – 1)/n2, while the Pareto optimal level of bids is bPO = 0. 
The VCM is based on a linear public goods game where n identical risk-neutral players 
choose a portion of their endowments e to contribute to a public good (Groves and Ledyard, 
1977). Player i’s contribution ci to the public good is multiplied by m and given to each of n 
players in the group, where 0 < m < 1 and m×n > 1. Thus, the payoff from the VCM for player i 
can be written as: 
πi
VCM
 = e – ci + m∑jcj.         (2)
 
The Nash equilibrium in the VCM is to free ride by contributing nothing, i.e. c
*
 = 0, while the 
Pareto optimal solution is to contribute one’s full endowment to the public good, i.e. cPO = e.  
In the VCM (2), over-contribution relative to the Nash equilibrium leads to outcomes that 
are closer to the Pareto optimal result. On the other hand, in the contest (1), bidding is socially 
wasteful and the most socially desirable outcome is for all participants to bid 0. While playing 
the games in ensemble does not change the standard Nash equilibrium prediction in either game, 
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Section 3 provides conjectures about the direction of probable spillover when games are played 
in ensemble. 
 
2.2. Experimental Procedures 
The experiment was conducted at the Vernon Smith Experimental Economics 
Laboratory. Subjects were recruited from a pool of undergraduate students at Purdue University. 
A total of 120 subjects participated in 6 sessions, with 20 subjects participating in each session. 
All subjects participated in only one session of this study. Some students had participated in 
other economics experiments that were unrelated to this research. 
The computerized experimental sessions used z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) to record 
subject decisions and also (in the Simultaneous treatment) to record the order of decisions. We 
conducted three treatments as summarized in Table 1: a Baseline Contest treatment, a Baseline 
VCM treatment, and a Simultaneous treatment in which these two games were played 
simultaneously.
4
 Subjects were given the instructions (available in the on-line appendix) at the 
beginning of the session and the experimenter read the instructions aloud. In each session, 20 
subjects were randomly assigned to groups of n = 4 players and stayed in the same group 
throughout the entire experiment, playing each game for a total of 20 periods. 
At the beginning of each period, each subject received an endowment of 80 francs in the 
contest (or VCM) and was asked to enter his or her bid (or contribution in the VCM). In the 
                                                 
4 Note that treatments with two simultaneous contests or two simultaneous public goods are also possible as 
baselines. We believe that our Baseline Contest and Baseline VCM treatments are more appropriate for several 
reasons. First, this design allows us to see if behavior in ensemble games is different from behavior in isolated 
games. Second, if two simultaneous contests or two simultaneous public goods were played as the baseline, subjects 
would learn the game more quickly in the baselines than in the Simultaneous treatment, and we would not be able to 
make a direct comparison between treatments. Finally, although subjects did earn double the amount in 
Simultaneous as in VCM and Contest baselines, we do not expect to see an endowment effect since only two periods 
were randomly selected at the end for payment. 
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lottery contest, subjects competed with each other for the prize value of v = 80 francs. In the 
VCM, each subject chose a portion of the 80-franc endowment to contribute to the public good, 
and kept the other portion for him/herself. Each player’s contribution to the public good was 
multiplied by m = 0.4 and the total of all contributions given to each of the 4 players in the 
group. We selected parameters that result in theoretically expected payoffs that are close in both 
games (85 and 80). Subjects did not know others’ decisions before making their own decisions. 
After all subjects made their decisions, the sum of all bids (or contributions in the VCM) in each 
group was displayed on the output screen together with the outcome, and earnings were 
determined.  
During the Simultaneous treatment, the contest and VCM games were displayed side by 
side on the same screen.
5
 Each subject received a separate endowment of 80 francs in the contest 
and a separate endowment of 80 francs in the VCM at the beginning of each period. These 
endowments could not be transferred between games. Subjects were required to input their 
choices for each of the two games before moving on to the next period. To account for any order 
effect within each period, in one of the two Simultaneous sessions, the contest game was 
displayed on the left (the VCM game was on the right), and in the other Simultaneous session, 
the contest game was displayed on the right (the VCM game was on the left).
6
 
At the end of the experiment, two periods from the game were selected for payment using 
a random draw from a bingo cage. In the Simultaneous treatment, two periods from each game 
(contest and VCM) were selected using the same method. Experimental francs were used 
                                                 
5 We used categorical (and not ordinal) nomenclature to label each game, the colors blue and green (instead of, for 
example, 1 and 2 or A and B). 
6 When the contest game was displayed on the left, subjects made a decision in the contest game first 92% of the 
time. When the VCM was displayed on the left, subjects made a decision in the VCM game first 93% of the time. 
This is unsurprising, given that over 95% of subjects in the experiment self-reported that they read and write from 
left to right horizontally in their native language, and that all instructions were in English, which reads from left to 
right. Despite differences in order of decision-making within each period, we do not find any difference between 
individual behavior in the two Simultaneous sessions; therefore, we pool the sessions. 
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throughout the experiment, with a conversion rate of 25 francs = $1. Subjects earned $18 on 
average, and sessions (including instruction time) lasted on average 75 minutes.  
 
3. Hypothesis Development 
3.1. Behavioral Spillover 
Although standard theoretical models do not predict that behavior during simultaneous 
interaction in two games should differ from behavior when each game is played in isolation, 
related work has found that behavioral spillovers do occur (Huck et al, 2011; Bednar et al., 2012; 
Cason et al., 2012).
7
 Our study is intended to contribute additional evidence to inform the 
discussion of what behavioral effects may impact individual decisions when two disparate 
environments are experienced simultaneously. We provide two conjectures that predict the 
direction of behavioral spillovers in this context based on strategic uncertainty and path-
dependence. 
 
3.2. Strategic Uncertainty 
Related work suggests that we can predict which game will, and which game will not, be 
affected by simultaneous play in another game by observing the characteristics of the games and 
behavior when each game is played in isolation (Bednar et al., 2012; Cason et al., 2012). One 
dimension on which two games may be compared is strategic uncertainty. Games with higher 
strategic uncertainty are more demanding on subjects’ belief formation and therefore may 
produce greater cognitive load relative to games with lower strategic uncertainty. When playing 
                                                 
7 Although we consider the impact of simultaneous game-play, spillovers of behavior or expectations are also 
present in settings with sequential game-play, as in as in Knez and Camerer (2000), Ahn et al. (2001), Cherry et al. 
(2003), Devetag (2005), Cherry and Shogren (2007), Herrmann and Orzen (2008), Dickinson and Oxoby (2011) and 
Cason et al. (2012). 
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ensembles of games, subjects may apply common analogies to disparate situations if the 
cognitive cost of developing a separate strategy for each game is too high (Samuelson, 2001).  
Related work has conjectured that games with lower strategic uncertainty have a stronger 
behavioral spillover effect onto games with higher strategic uncertainty (Bednar et al., 2012; 
Cason et al., 2012). One reason cited for this effect is that learning a strategy requires less effort 
or cognitive load in a game with lower strategic uncertainty relative to a game with higher 
strategic uncertainty (Cason et al., 2012). 
Relevant measures for assessment of strategic uncertainty are the ex ante measure of 
complexity of the game and the ex post measure of volatility of behavior in the game. Using the 
measure of complexity, we posit that strategic uncertainty is greater in the contest than in the 
VCM. In the VCM, each subject forms beliefs about other’s contributions and determines her 
probable outcome. In the contest, on the other hand, each subject must first form beliefs about 
other’s bids and then form a belief about the probability that she will win, where this probability 
depends on her bid but also depends on other group members’ bids.8 While the equilibrium of 
the VCM is in dominant strategies, the equilibrium of the contest is not. Moreover, the payoff 
function is flatter (and concave) in the contest as compared to the VCM.  
Bednar et al. (2012) and Cason et al. (2012) also use a measurement of volatility of 
choices called ‘entropy’ to describe the degree of strategic uncertainty. Similarly, we will be able 
to confirm the difference in strategic uncertainty between games ex post, measuring the degree of 
volatility in individual decision-making. Based on previous research, and the fact that the contest 
is a more complex game than the VCM, we expect subjects to apply strategies from the VCM to 
choices in the contest, causing behavioral spillover onto the contest. 
                                                 
8 Understanding probability can be difficult for subjects due to bounded rationality (Camerer, 2003). 
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Conjecture 1: Behavioral spillover caused by differences in strategic uncertainty will 
prompt subjects to apply strategies from the VCM to choices in the contest. 
 
3.3. Path-Dependence 
Path-dependence is the extent to which the outcomes of previous periods matter for the 
current period (Page, 2006). For the purpose of this analysis, we define path dependence as a 
within-game phenomenon where only past behavior and experience in the same game affect 
future behavior. Van Huyck et al. (1990) use path-dependence to explain how decisions in future 
periods are influenced by subjects’ shared experience within the same coordination game. Many 
games are path-dependent in the sense that current choices depend to some extent on previous 
choices of group members, but some games may be more path-dependent than others. Path 
dependence is generally determined after data on behavior is obtained, yet the structure of the 
game can also inform the level of path dependence ex ante.  
We argue that the VCM is more path-dependent than the contest for several reasons. 
First, feedback in the VCM is less noisy (there is no probability involved), and individuals can 
react optimally to previous group members’ choices without repeated exogenous shocks (e.g., 
winning the prize or not, as in the contest). Second, because the VCM does not involve a risk 
component (except strategic risk), individuals can more easily calculate their subjective best 
responses. While the VCM has a dominant strategy and conditioning one’s behavior on the 
behavior of others is not required, the literature does document the existence of conditional 
cooperators, whose behavior depends heavily on behavior of group members (Fischbacher et al., 
2001). 
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In addition to evaluating the structure of the game, evidence of path-dependent behavior 
can be obtained ex post through comparing individual behavior in period t with group behavior 
in period t-1 (Falk et al., 2012). More path-dependent games should be less susceptible to 
influence from other games, because individuals rely heavily on actions of others in previous 
rounds of the same game while making decisions. On the other hand, less path-dependent games 
should be more susceptible to influence from other games, because individuals are less 
influenced by actions of others in the same game. 
Conjecture 2: The contest, which is less path-dependent, is more likely to be susceptible 
to behavioral spillover as compared to the VCM, which is more path-dependent. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
4.1. Overview 
Table 2 reports the average contribution in the VCM and the average bid in the contest 
across all treatments. In contrast to the theoretical prediction of b
*
 = 15, we find significant 
overbidding of about 120% in the Baseline Contest treatment (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-
value < 0.05, n=10).
9
 This finding is consistent with previous experimental literature on contests, 
which document that on average subjects overbid relative to the theoretical predictions in the 
range from 20% to 200% (Sheremeta, 2011; Morgan et al., 2012).
10
 As a result of overbidding, 
subjects’ payoffs are significantly lower than predicted. 
The unique equilibrium prediction for contributions in the VCM is c
*
 = 0. Relative to 
theoretical predictions, we find significant over-contribution in the VCM in the Baseline VCM 
                                                 
9 Unless otherwise stated, all non-parametric tests employ four subjects in a group across all periods as one 
independent observation. 
10 Sheremeta (2010a; 2010b; 2011) and Sheremeta and Zheng (2010) cite noise and errors, probability judgment 
biases, and a non-monetary utility of winning as explanations for overbidding. 
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treatment, which leads to more socially favorable outcomes (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value 
< 0.05, n=10). This finding is also consistent with previous experimental studies, which report 
that over-contribution is common in public goods environments due to altruism or social norms 
(Ledyard, 1995). For example, Fehr and Gachter (2000) report contribution levels at 40-60% of 
the endowment during the experiment, with contributions falling to 27% in the final period.  
Result 1. There is significant overbidding in the contest and significant over-contribution 
in the VCM relative to theoretical predictions. 
Due to learning and interaction between group members, behavior may change during the 
course of the 20 periods. Throughout this section, we examine decisions in all periods of the 
experiment as well as average bids and contributions in “early” and “later” periods. We use the 
average bid (contribution) in the first 5 and last 5 periods of the contest (VCM) when making 
comparisons between early and later periods; nevertheless choosing different subsets of early and 
later periods gives us very similar results. 
Figure 1 displays the distribution of bids in the contest over the first and the last 5 periods 
of the experiment. Contrary to the unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium of 15, individual bids 
are distributed on the entire strategy space in all treatments. This variance in bids persists 
throughout all periods of the experiment. The high variance in individual bids is consistent with 
previous experimental findings on contests (e.g., Davis and Reilly, 1998; Potters et al., 1998; 
Sheremeta, 2011). 
Figure 2 displays the distribution of contributions in the VCM over the first and the last 5 
periods of the experiment. In the first 5 periods of the experiment, individual contributions in the 
VCM are also distributed on the entire strategy space. However, in the last 5 periods of the 
experiment, individual contributions in the VCM are concentrated around the Nash equilibrium 
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of 0. These observations are also consistent with previous experimental findings on VCMs (e.g., 
Fehr and Gachter, 2000; Fischbacher et al., 2001). 
 
4.2. Comparison between Simultaneous and Baseline Treatments 
Figure 3 displays the time series of the average contribution and the average bid for the 
Baseline and Simultaneous treatments. In the Baseline VCM treatment, the average contribution 
in the VCM starts at 36.7 in the first 5 periods and decreases significantly to 12.6 in the last 5 
periods (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value < 0.05, n=10).
11
 Similarly, in the Simultaneous 
treatment, the average contribution starts at 35.6 in the first 5 periods and decreases significantly 
to 11.5 in the last 5 periods (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value < 0.05, n=10). The difference 
between the average contribution to the VCM in the Baseline and the Simultaneous treatment is 
not significant (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value = 0.54, n=m=10). This difference is also not 
significant for either the first 5 (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value = 0.65, n=m=10) or last 5 
periods of the experiment (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value = 0.76, n=m=10).  
Result 2: Simultaneous participation in both the VCM and the contest does not have a 
significant effect on contributions in the VCM. 
Falk et al. (2012) use a design in which subjects play two public goods games 
simultaneously. They find that individuals are influenced in each game by the contributions of 
their own group members, but not by the contributions of the other group members. We find that 
even when playing two different games and with the same subjects, bids in the contest do not 
                                                 
11 The rank-sum test uses as one independent observation the difference between the average contribution by four 
subjects in a group in the first 5 periods and the last 5 periods. 
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influence contributions to the public good.
12
 Note that due in part to power limitations, we 
cannot say with certainty that the behavioral spillover from the contest to the VCM does not 
exist.
13
 However, as we show next, even with the same power, we do find a significant spillover 
from the VCM to the contest, indicating that spillover effects exist. 
In the Baseline Contest treatment, the average bid starts at 36.5 in the first 5 periods and 
decreases significantly to 33.7 in the last 5 periods (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value = 0.06, 
n=10). In the Simultaneous treatment, the average bid in the contest starts at 31.5 in the first 5 
periods and decreases significantly to 24.4 in the last 5 periods (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-
value < 0.05, n=10). Overall, the declining bid trend in both treatments is consistent with 
previous research, documenting that overbidding decreases over time (Davis and Reilly, 1998; 
Sheremeta, 2011). 
Figure 4 displays, by group, the average dissipation rate in the contest, defined as the sum 
of all bids divided by the value of the prize. Groups in the Baseline Contest treatment have 
greater dissipation rates than groups in the Simultaneous treatment. The difference between 
treatments appears mainly after subjects obtain some experience in playing the game(s). In the 
first 5 periods, the average bid in the Baseline treatment is higher, but it is not significantly 
different from the average bid in the Simultaneous treatment (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value = 
0.20, n=m=10). However, the average bid in Baseline is significantly higher than the average bid 
in the Simultaneous treatment in the last 5 periods (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value < 0.05, 
n=m=10). This finding suggests that simultaneous participation in both the VCM and the contest 
                                                 
12 Note that in the Falk et al. (2012) and in our study, endowments are not shared between the two games; rather, 
subjects receive a set endowment for each game. This result may be most applicable in this setting, but whether this 
result holds when endowments are shared across simultaneous games could be considered in future work. 
13 Using an average of contributions across 20 rounds, we must assume that each group is one independent 
observation and therefore there are only 10 independent observations per treatment. With only 10 independent 
observations, we have power of 80% to detect an effect size of 1.19 standard deviations using the Wilcoxon Mann-
Whitney test. 
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reduces overbidding in the contest, although this behavioral spillover becomes more pronounced 
in later periods of the experiment. When averaging bids across all periods, we still find that bids 
are significantly higher in the Baseline treatment as compared to the Simultaneous treatment 
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value = 0.06, n=m=10). 
Result 3: Simultaneous participation in both the VCM and the contest reduces 
overbidding in the contest. 
We can conclude from Results 2 and 3 that bid choices in the contest are influenced by 
contribution choices in the VCM, but that contribution choices in the VCM are not as affected by 
bid choices in the contest. These findings provide initial support for ex ante Conjectures 1 and 2, 
suggesting that strategic uncertainty and path-dependence are two of the driving forces of 
behavioral spillovers. 
 
4.3. Behavioral Effects 
As discussed in Section 3, strategic uncertainty and path-dependence are two aspects of 
games that predict direction of behavioral spillover ex ante. The design of our experiment also 
allows us to provide an ex post analysis of strategic uncertainty and path-dependence in both the 
VCM and contest. Conjecture 1 predicts that behavioral spillover caused by differences in 
strategic uncertainty will prompt subjects to apply strategies from the VCM onto choices in the 
contest. Previous studies use a measure of entropy to evaluate the degree of volatility in 
individual decision-making and to determine the ex post amount of strategic uncertainty present 
in the game (Bednar et al., 2012; Cason et al., 2012). However, in both studies of Bednar et al. 
(2012) and Cason et al. (2012), the strategy space is very restricted (from 2 to 7 choices), and 
thus it is straightforward to measure the degree to which subjects arrive at a stable state (i.e., 
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entropy state). In contrast, in our experiment, each of the four subjects in a group can choose any 
integer number between 0 and 80. Therefore, we use two alternative measures of the degree of 
volatility in individual decision-making. First, we compute the absolute difference between the 
decisions made in period t and period t-1. Second, we calculate the number of stable states for 
each subject. We define a stable state as whenever a subject makes the same bid or contribution 
choice in period t as in period t-1. We calculate both measures of volatility using the first 5 
periods of game-play, since we want to observe the level of volatility before subjects become 
experienced. Based on both measures, we find that in the first 5 periods of the Simultaneous 
treatment, the average volatility of bids in the contest is significantly higher than the average 
volatility of contributions in the VCM.
14
 These results suggest that in the Simultaneous 
treatment, the VCM game should have a stronger behavioral spillover effect onto the contest, 
which is predicted by Conjecture 1 and is in line with Results 2 and 3. 
The prediction of Conjecture 2 is that the contest is less path-dependent than the VCM, 
and thus it is more likely to be susceptible to behavioral spillover from the VCM. To examine 
path-dependence, in Table 3 we report estimates of panel regressions conducted separately for 
each treatment. In these regressions, the dependent variable is either subject’s bid in the contest 
(regressions 1 and 3) or contribution in the VCM (regressions 2 and 4). The independent 
variables are bid-lag, group-bid-lag (lagged average bid of other group members), contribution-
lag, and group-contribution-lag (lagged average contribution of other group members). All 
regressions use a random effects error structure for the individual subjects to account for 
                                                 
14  The average absolute difference of bids is 17.4 and the absolute difference of contributions is 13.6. The estimated 
number of stable states for each subjects indicate that 29.4% of contributions to the VCM and only 18.1% of bids in 
the contest are qualified as stable (i.e., state of entropy). This difference is significant (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-
value < 0.05, n=m=10). Note also that the volatility of bids is also higher than the volatility of contributions in the 
last 5 periods of the experiment, although the difference is not significant. The average absolute difference of bids is 
14.5 and the absolute difference of contributions is 9.1. Furthermore, 42.0% of contributions to the VCM and only 
36.5% of bids in the contest are qualified as stable, although again this difference is not significant. 
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repeated measures, and a period trend to account for learning. Standard errors are clustered at the 
group level. 
According to the estimation results in regression (1), the main determinant of bid in the 
Baseline Contest treatment is bid-lag, indicating that the individual subject’s own previous bid 
influences her behavior in the contest. On the other hand, regression (2) shows that contribution 
in the Baseline VCM treatment is influenced by contribution-lag and group-contribution-lag, 
indicating that both individual subject’s own previous bid, as well as group members’ decisions, 
influence behavior in the VCM. These results provide additional support for our prediction that 
the VCM is more path-dependent (i.e., dependent on own and group previous behavior) than the 
contest.  
Most importantly, by estimating regressions (3) and (4), we find that in the Simultaneous 
treatment, bid is not correlated with group-bid-lag, while contribution is significantly correlated 
with group-contribution-lag. Therefore, our ex post estimation results indicate that the VCM is 
more path-dependent than the contest. In line with Conjecture 2, the stronger path-dependence in 
the VCM causes the behavioral spillover from the VCM onto the contest. 
Estimation results in Table 3 also indicate that contribution-lag negatively affects bid in 
the contest (regression 3) and bid-lag negatively affects contribution in the VCM (regression 4), 
although the latter finding is not statistically significant.
15
 These results suggest that bids and 
contributions are negatively correlated. We further explore this correlation in the following sub-
section. 
 
 
                                                 
15 Both coefficients are significant when using the data only from the first 5 periods of the experiment. 
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4.4 Correlation of Bids and Contributions 
Because of the within-subjects design of the Simultaneous treatment, we can directly 
compare bids in the contest with contributions in the VCM for the same individual. Figure 5 
displays individual contributions and bids for the Simultaneous treatment, averaged over periods 
1-5 and periods 16-20. We use average choices in periods 1-5 of the game in this analysis for 
several reasons. First, we want to observe behavior while subjects are not yet heavily influenced 
by interaction with group members. Second, we also want to allow for some learning of the 
payoff structure of the game. An average of choices in periods 1-5 provides a compromise 
between these two considerations. We also compare our results for earlier periods 1-5 to later 
periods 16-20, when subjects have been maximally influenced by behavior of their group 
members in both games. 
A Spearman’s rank correlation test shows that individuals who contribute more to the 
VCM also bid less in the contest in the first 5 periods of the game, and this correlation is 
significant at the 10% level when bids are aggregated at the individual level across the 5 rounds 
(correlation -0.27, p-value < 0.10). The negative correlation between individual contributions 
and bids disappears over time. When analyzing the last 5 periods of the experiment, we do not 
find a significant correlation (correlation 0.13, p-value = 0.43). This result is not surprising, 
given that by the end of the experiment, subjects’ decisions have already been heavily influenced 
by the decisions of others and therefore social preferences play a less important role in the later 
periods.  
Result 4. Bids in the contest are negatively correlated with contributions to the VCM in 
early periods, suggesting that inherently more competitive subjects are less cooperative and vice 
versa. 
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To explain the negative correlation between bids and contributions, we consider two 
competing theories that are often employed to explain individual behavior in the public goods 
and contest experiments. Two common explanations for non-zero contributions to public goods 
are based on bounded rationality or mistakes (Andreoni, 1995; Anderson et al., 1998) and social 
preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Fischbacher et al., 2001; Falk et al., 2005). The same 
arguments are also often applied to explain behavior in contests (Herrmann and Orzen, 2008; 
Sheremeta, 2011; Mago et al., 2012). The design of our Simultaneous treatment enables us to 
distinguish between these two competing theories, because they generate opposing predictions 
for the direction of correlation between bids and contributions. 
Bounded rationality and mistakes are often cited as reasons why behavior is not in line 
with theory in many settings. Using a quantal response equilibrium (QRE) model, which 
accounts for errors made by individual subjects, Anderson et al. (1998) show that depending on 
the magnitude of the decision error, mean contributions to the VCM lie between the Nash 
prediction (c
*
 = 0) and half the endowment (c = 40), and higher decision errors correspond to 
higher contributions. Sheremeta (2011) shows that according to QRE, mean bids in the contest 
lie between the Nash equilibrium (b
*
 = 15) and half the endowment (b = 40), and higher decision 
errors correspond to higher bids. Therefore, bounded rationality implies that subjects who make 
mistakes both contribute and bid more, which should result in a positive, rather than a negative, 
correlation between bids and contributions. 
Social preferences are among other commonly cited reasons why subjects’ behavior 
deviates from theoretical benchmarks. Intuitively, pro-social behavior implies higher 
contributions (Andreoni, 1995; Fischbacher et al., 2001), while spite implies lower contributions 
to the VCM (Falk et al., 2005). On the other hand, pro-sociality implies lower bids and spite 
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implies higher bids in the contest (Hehenkamp et al., 2004; Mago et al., 2012). The main reason 
why social preferences work in the opposite direction in the VCM and the contest is that in the 
VCM individual contributions exert a positive externality on others, while in the contest 
individual bids exert a negative externality.
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We conclude, therefore, that the negative correlation between bids and contributions can 
be explained by social preferences but not by bounded rationality. This finding is also in line 
with related work on social preferences and sorting into competitive environments (Dohmen and 
Falk, 2011; Bartling et al., 2009; Teyssier, 2009). In contrast to previous studies, however, we 
did not explicitly elicit social preferences, but instead we measured cooperative individual 
behavior in the VCM and compared it to competitive individual behavior in the contest.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
We study simultaneous decision-making in two contrasting environments: an 
environment that encourages competition (a lottery contest) and an environment that encourages 
cooperation (a public good game). We find that simultaneous participation in the public good 
game affects behavior in the contest, decreasing sub-optimal overbidding in the contest. 
However, contributions to the public good are not affected by simultaneous participation in the 
                                                 
16 Similar to pro-sociality and spite, one can make an argument that inequity aversion can explain the negative 
correlation between contributions in the VCM and bids in the contest. Fehr and Schmidt (1999), for example, show 
that subjects who dislike disadvantageous inequity (i.e., the case when subjects dislike having the lowest relative 
payoff) should make lower contributions in the VCM in order to avoid the circumstance where they are the highest 
contributors with the lowest payoffs. Similarly, Grund and Sliwka (2005) and Herrmann and Orzen (2008) show that 
disadvantageous inequity aversion should cause subjects to bid more in the lottery contest in order to avoid a 
circumstance where they do not win a prize and thus receive the lowest payoff. Conversely to disadvantageous 
inequity aversion, advantageous inequality aversion (i.e., the case when subjects dislike having the highest relative 
payoff) should increase VCM contributions and decrease contest bids. Therefore, both disadvantageous and 
advantageous inequity aversion imply negative correlation between bids and contributions. It is important to 
emphasize that although inequality aversion is a potential explanation of our findings, in a recent study, Blanco et al. 
(2011) showed that there is a low correlation of subjects’ inequality aversion between different games. 
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contest. The direction of behavioral spillover can be explained by differences in strategic 
uncertainty and path-dependence across the two games. Our design also allows us to 
simultaneously compare individual preferences for cooperation and competition. We find that in 
early periods of the experiment, there is a significant negative correlation between decisions 
made in competitive and cooperative environments, which can be justified by social preferences 
such as altruism or spite but not by bounded rationality theory. 
Our findings provide clear evidence that the institutional context matters for some 
decision-making environments. Given that many activities in practice involve simultaneous 
decision-making in environments similar to contests and public goods, it is important to continue 
to study these competitive and cooperative environments in ensemble. Studies of other 
alternative environments in which there is competition (such as first and second price auctions, 
oligopolistic competition, and rank-order tournaments) and cooperation (such as trust games, 
weakest-link public goods, and common pool resources) are of great interest. Investigating 
behavioral spillover in different environments will allow for the development of a unifying 
theory of behavioral spillover. Finally, it is important to investigate how behavioral spillovers 
can be used to design more efficient economic systems. We leave these extensions for future 
research. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
Table 1: Summary of Treatments 
Treatment Game Played 
Number of 
 Sessions 
Number of 
 Subjects 
Number of Independent 
 Observations 
Baseline Contest Contest 2 40 10 
Baseline VCM VCM 2 40 10 
Simultaneous Contest & VCM 2 40 10 
 
 
Table 2: Average Statistics 
Game Played Variable 
Equilibrium 
 Prediction 
Simultaneous 
Treatment 
Baseline 
 Treatments 
Contest 
bid 15 26.8 (0.8) 33.5 (0.8) 
payoff 85 73.2 (1.2) 66.5 (1.2) 
VCM 
contribution 0 22.4 (0.9) 23.9 (1.0) 
payoff 80 93.4 (0.7) 94.3 (0.8) 
Standard error of the mean in parentheses. 
 
 
Table 3: Regression Models of Individual Subject Choices 
Treatment Baseline Simultaneous 
Regression (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Contest VCM Contest VCM 
Subject’s Choice bid contribution bid contribution 
bid-lag  0.535***  0.406*** -0.055 
 (0.105)  (0.059) (0.034) 
group-bid-lag -0.123  -0.054 -0.059 
 (0.099)  (0.065) (0.052) 
contribution-lag  0.562*** -0.068* 0.456*** 
  (0.063) (0.033) (0.042) 
group-contribution-lag  0.159* -0.063 0.348*** 
  (0.068) (0.063) (0.029) 
period -0.097 -0.518** -0.575*** -0.432*** 
 (0.051) (0.187) (0.128) (0.126) 
constant 20.869*** 11.303** 26.577*** 10.967** 
 (5.747) (4.154) (3.981) (3.565) 
Observations 760 760 760 760 
Number of subjects 40 40 40 40 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. All regressions use a random effects error 
structure for the individual subjects to account for repeated measures, and a period 
trend to account for learning. Standard errors are clustered at the group level. group 
bid-lag and group contribution-lag only include the bids and contributions of all 
other group members, excluding the individual under study. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of Bids 
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Figure 2: Distribution of Contributions 
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Figure 3: Average Bid and Contribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Dissipation Rate in the Contest by Groups 
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Figure 5: Correlation of Bids and Contributions (Periods 1-5 and 16-20 averaged) 
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[For On-Line Publication] 
Appendix – Instructions for the Simultaneous Treatment 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: In this experiment you will participate in a game with three other participants. You will not 
know the identity of the participants you are grouped with. The experiment will consist of 20 periods. You will 
participate in both a BLUE GAME and a GREEN GAME at the same time and with the same participants. The 
BLUE GAME will appear on the left side of the screen and the GREEN GAME will appear on the right side of the 
screen at the same time in all 20 periods.  
At the end of the experiment 2 out of 20 periods will be randomly selected for payment for the BLUE 
GAME and 2 out of 20 periods will be randomly selected for payment for the GREEN GAME. After you have 
completed all periods two tokens will be randomly drawn out of a bingo cage containing tokens numbered from 1 to 
20. The token numbers determine which two periods are going to be paid in the BLUE GAME. These tokens will be 
returned to the bingo cage, and two tokens will be randomly drawn again out of a bingo cage containing tokens 
numbered from 1 to 20. The token numbers determine which two periods are going to be paid in the GREEN 
GAME. 
Each period you will be given 80 francs for the BLUE GAME and 80 francs for the GREEN GAME. 
Francs will be converted to U.S. dollars at the end of the experiment at the rate of 25 francs = $1. Each period, you 
will select a bid for the BLUE GAME and an allocation for the GREEN GAME. When you are ready to make your 
decision, click on the “input boxes” below “How much would you like to bid?” and “How much would you like to 
allocate to the Group Account?” and the program will allow you to enter in your number choices. When you are 
finished making your choices, click “Submit”. 
 
 
 
BLUE GAME: Each period, you and all other participants will be given an initial endowment of 80 francs and you 
will be asked to decide how much you want to bid for a reward. The reward is worth 80 francs to you and the other 
three participants in your group. You may bid any integer number of francs between 0 and 80. After all participants 
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have made their decisions, your earnings for the period are calculated. These earnings will be converted to cash and 
paid at the end of the experiment if the current period is the period that is randomly chosen for payment. If you 
receive the reward your period earnings are equal to your endowment plus the reward minus your bid. If you do not 
receive the reward your period earnings are equal to your endowment minus your bid. 
 
If you receive the reward:     Earnings = Endowment + Reward – Your Bid = 80 + 80 – Your Bid  
If you do not receive the reward:   Earnings = Endowment – Your Bid = 80 – Your Bid 
 
The more you bid, the more likely you are to receive the reward. The more the other participants in your group bid, 
the less likely you are to receive the reward. Specifically, for each franc you bid you will receive one lottery ticket. 
At the end of each period the computer draws randomly one ticket among all the tickets purchased by 4 
participants in the group, including you. The owner of the drawn ticket receives the reward of 80 francs. Thus, your 
chance of receiving the reward is given by the number of francs you bid divided by the total number of francs all 4 
participants in your group bid. You can never guarantee yourself the reward. However, by increasing your bid, you 
can increase your chance of receiving the reward. Regardless of who receives the reward, all participants will have 
to pay their bids. 
 
Chance of receiving the 
reward 
= 
Your Bid 
Sum of all 4 Bids in your group 
 
In case all participants bid zero, the reward is randomly assigned to one of the four participants in the group.  
 
Example: This is a hypothetical example used to illustrate how the computer is making a random draw. Let’s say 
participant 1 bids 10 francs, participant 2 bids 15 francs, participant 3 bids 0 francs, and participant 4 bids 40 francs. 
Therefore, the computer assigns 10 lottery tickets to participant 1, 15 lottery tickets to participant 2, 0 lottery tickets 
to participant 3, and 40 lottery tickets for participant 4. Then the computer randomly draws one lottery ticket out of 
65 (10 + 15 + 0 + 40). As you can see, participant 4 has the highest chance of receiving the reward: 0.62 = 40/65. 
Participant 2 has 0.23 = 15/65 chance, participant 1 has 0.15 = 10/65 chance, and participant 3 has 0 = 0/65 chance 
of receiving the reward. 
After all participants make their bids, the computer will make a random draw which will decide who 
receives the reward. Then the computer will calculate your period earnings based on your bid and whether you 
received the reward or not.  
 
GREEN GAME:  Each period you will be given 80 francs and you will be asked to decide how much of this 
amount you want to allocate to a Group Account. The remainder will be automatically allocated to your Individual 
Account. You may allocate any integer number of francs between 0 and 80. After all participants have made their 
decisions, your earnings for the period are calculated. These earnings will be converted to cash and paid at the end 
of the experiment if the current period is the period that is randomly chosen for payment. Your earnings consist of 
two parts 
 
1) Your earnings from the Individual Account  
2) Your earnings from the Group Account  
 
Your earnings from the Individual Account equal to the francs that you keep for yourself and do not depend on the 
decisions of others. Therefore, for every franc you keep for yourself in your Individual Account, you earn 1 franc. 
 
Your earnings from the Group Account depend on the total number of francs allocated to the Group Account by all 
4 group members (including you). In particular, your earnings from the Group Account are 40 percent of the total 
allocation of all 4 group members (including you) to the Group Account. Therefore, for every franc you allocate to 
the Group Account, you increase the total allocation to the Group Account by 1 franc. Therefore, your earnings from 
the Group Account rise by 0.4×1=0.4 francs. And the earnings of the other group members also rise by 0.4 francs 
each, so that the total earnings of the group from the Group Account rise by 1.6 francs. 
In summary, your period earnings are determined as follows: 
 
Your earnings = earnings from the Individual Account + earnings from the Group Account =  
32 
 
 =80 - (your allocation to the Group Account) + 0.4×(allocation of 4 group members to the Group Account) 
 
Example: Suppose that you allocated 40 francs to the Group Account and that the other three members of your 
group allocated a total of 120 francs. This makes a total of 160 francs in the Group Account. In this case each 
member of the group receives earnings from the Group Account of 0.4×160 = 64 francs. In addition, you also 
receive 40 francs from your Individual Account since you have kept 40 francs to your Individual Account. 
OUTCOME SCREEN 
BLUE GAME: At the end of each period, your bid, the sum of all bids in your group, whether you received the 
reward or not, and the earnings for the period are reported on the outcome screen as shown below. Once the 
outcome screen is displayed you should record your results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet under the 
appropriate heading. 
GREEN GAME: At the end of each period, your allocation and the sum of all allocations in your group are 
reported on the outcome screen as shown below. To aid you in your calculation, you are also shown your income 
from your individual account and your income from the group account. Once the outcome screen is displayed you 
should record your results for the period on your Personal Record Sheet under the appropriate heading. 
 
 
